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I. INTRODUCTION
A striking  feature  in the reLent  'conomic  performance  of a  number
of countries,  particularly  in  Latin  America,  has  been the  rapid  rise in  the
siFe  of the  public  sectors.  In Mexico,  perhaps  the  most striking  example
of such a phenomenon,  total spending  of the public  sector,  which
represented  only  25.6  percent  of  GDP  in  1973,  had  risen  to  46.5  percent  of
GDP by 1982.  At the same  time  that  this  increase  in the size  of the
government  was  taking  place,  there  were  also  equally  dramatic  increases  in
inflation,  the government  budget  deficit,  and the external  debt.  A
conclusion  that  has  been  drawn  by  planners  in  Mexico  and  elsewhere  is  that
stabilization  depends  in  some,  perhaps  vague,  way  on  a  successful  reduction
in  this  spending  of  the  government.
A cursory  examination  of  the  composition  of  government  spending  in
most  of  these  countries  reveals  that  the  proportion  of  expenditures  going
to  service  debt,  both  domestic  and  foreign,  has also  risen  dramatically.
Accordingly,  attempts  to  stabilize  the  government's  fiscal  situation  have
often  focussed  upon  reduction  of  the  burden  of interest  obligations.  It
is,  of  course,  rather  difficult  to  do  so  with  foreign  currency  denominated
debt.  It is also  difficult  to reduce  the  real  value  of domestic  debt
service  by inflating  the  economy  since  most  domestic  public  debt  is  short
term  and thus  pays  essentially  inflation-indexed  interest. Governments
have thus  attempted  to carry  out financial  policies  designed  to lower
nominal  interest  rates,  while  at  the  same  time  maintaining  a fixed,  or  at- 2  -
least  managed,  exchange rate.  Such policies have,  however, often
encountered  serious  problems.  It appears  that in many cases  a high real
interest  rate  is required  to induce  the  public  to  hold  domestic  debt. 1 If
a fall in the  interest  rate is observed,  then there  is an immediate  flight
of capital,  causing  the interest  rate to rise once again.  The fact  that-
capital flows are highly sensitive  to changes in interest  and exchange
rates thus greatly limits the scope  of the government  in carrying  out
stabilization  measures  via interest  rate  management.
Our aim in this paper will be to examine  the implications  for
certain  key macroeconomic  variables,  in particular  the rate of inflation,
the interest  rate,  and tl. rate of growth  of real GNP, of reductions  in
public  spending.  We will,  in addition, attempt +  terive welfare
implications  of these  reductions.  The  constraint  on theL.  Juctions,  and,
indeed, often their intended target, is the level of foreign  exchange
reserves.  To what  extent is stabilization of these macrovariables
consistt-at  with a sustainable  foreign reserve position and tolerable
consumer  welfare?  We might consider  both tax increases  and expenditure
reductions  as stabilization  measures.  The experience  of most developing
countries  has been,  however,  that it is quite  difficult  to raise  real tax
revenues. 2 We will therefore  focus  on reductions  in government  spending.
1/  More  precisely,  we mean that  the  interest  rate  deflated  by the  expected
rate  of devaluation  of the  domestic  currency  must  be  positive  and  large
in  order  to induce  people  to  hold  domestic  assets.
2/  In addition,  methodologies  for optimally  increasing  tax  revenues  have
been discussed  in detail  elsewhere. See, for example,  Stern (1984),
for a useful survey,  while Seade (1987)  gives an example  of current
empirical  work.-3-
In order to give some sense of the magnitudes  involved,  Table 1.1 gives
Mexican data on real growth, inflation, the  fiscal position of the
government,  and net foreign  reserves  for the  period  1973-85. It is clear
that the key variable  that is,  at least  superficially,  controlled  by the
government  and  that  has growth  dramaticallv  is  expenditure.
Two general approaches  have been used in examining  government
expenditures. The first  of these  is to consider  the  provision  of public
goods,  and  to derive  conditions  for  their  optimal production and
allocation. The appeal  of 'this  approach  is its theoretical  consistency;
however,  it is very difficult to implement empirically.  The second
approach,  that  is frequently  used in applied  general  equilibrium  analysis,
is to treat  government  output  as useless,  and to derive  the cost of its
production  to the rest of the economy.  If the output is to be worth
producing,  its benefits  must outweigh  its costs.  This approach,  while
being relatively straightforward to apply, overlooks the  fact that
government production may have  a direct positive impact on private
production.  Government infrastructure,  for example, such as roads or
education,  may contribute  to  the  efficiency  of  private  output. An analysis
that  only looks  at the crowding  out effects  of government  spending  ignores
these  benefits.
We will develop an intertemporal  general  equilibrium  model that
will be used to analyze reductions in government spending, and the
implications  for the exchange  rate and the  balance  of payments  of these
reductions. We will develop  our analysis  in the context  of an exchange
rate regime  that is typical  of many developing  countries:  the rate is
fixed,  but if the  foreign  reserves  of the  central  bank  fall  below  some-4-
critical  level  than  the  rate  is  devalued. The  current  and  capital  accounts
are fully  endogenous  in our model,  and  we will be able to derive  cettain
analytic conclusions  concerning  whether or not a particular  program af
public  expenditure  cuts lead& :o  unsustainable  losses  in foreign  reserves.
The  model  simultaneously  incorporates  both  public  infrastructure  as  well  as
public crowding out of the private sector. Government debt financing
affects the domestic interest rate, and since private investment  is
debt-financed  and interest  sensitive,  it can be crowded  out by increased
public  spending.
The  next  section  will give  a  brief  review  of  background  literature
as well  as provide  an intuitive  explanation  of our  model.  Section  III  will
formally  derive  the  analytics  of the  model,  while  section  IV will sketch  a
proof of the existence  of an intertemporal  equilibrium. Section  V will
give  some  policy  simulations  using  Mexican  data,  while  Section  VI will  be a
conclusion.
TabL_I1l:  Mcxico: Maero-Variables,  1973-85
1973  1974  1975 1976  1977  1978 1979  1980 1981  1982  1983  1984  1985
Real GDP c/  8.4  6.1  5.5  4.3  3.4  8.2  9.2  8.3  7.9  -0.5  -5.3  3.7  2.7
Publie  sector
revenues  k/  20.0 21.0  23.0  23.6 24.2  25.5  25.2  28.5 27.5  30.3  34.4  34.2 32.2
Public
expendituro  c/  25.6  26.7  31.8 32.0  29.5  31.0 32.2  35.5 41.1  46.5  42.7  41.5  40.5
Budget  balance  -5.6  -S.7  -8.8  -8.4  -5.3  -5.5  -6.0  -7.0  -13.6  -16.2  -8.3  -7.3  -8.3
Trade  balance  d/  -1.2  -3.4  -5.0  -3.0  0.1  -0.5  -1.2  -0.9  -1.7  6.2  10.0  7.5  4.9
Inflation  o/  16.0  22.4  10.4  22.4  41.2  15.8  18.3  24.5  25.5  57.5  99.3  63.6  55.2
Capital  flight  I/  668  755  784  2944  686  -66  231  -678  9733  8225  2415  2332  1917
&/  Percentage  change.  Source:  Indicadores  Economics.
k/  Total  revenues  of  the  public  sector  as  a percent  of  GDP.  Source: ibid.
j/  Total  expnditures  of  the  public  sector  as  a  percent  of GDP.  Z..urc*:  ibid.
;/  As  percent  of  GDP.  Source:  ibid.
&/  Percentage  change  in  the  annual  average  of  the  wholesale  price  index. Source: ibid.
V/  In  millions  of  US  dollars.  source:  Zedillo  (1986).II.  EXCHANGE  RATE  DETERMINATIj  AND  THE  REDUCTION  OF
GOVERNMENT  SPENDING:  BACKGROUND  AND INTUITION
The analysis  of "productive",  government  expenditure  has a long
history, dating to Samuelson (1954), and Musgrave (1959).  For recent
surveys of the literature st  3rennan  and Pincus (1983)  and Johansson
(1986).  Our approach, which  '11 be developed in do-2il in the next
section,  assumes  that  the  government  provides  infrastructure  which  enhances
private  productivity. This approach  has been developed  in Grossman  and
Lucas (1974), Barro (1981,  1984),  Barro and Grossman (1976),  Johanseon,
(1982),  and  Negishi  (1974).3  A problem  with  the  analysis  in  most  of these
articles is that they assume there to be a one-to-one  correspondence
between  government  spending  and the supply  of public  goods:  in practice
increases in government spending usually lead to rapidly decreasing
marginal  provision  of  public  goods.
There  have  been  several  recent  studies  that  construct
intertemporal  macroeconomic  models designed  to analyze fiscal  reduction
programs. 4 There are, however,  virtually  no such  models that consider
public investment, one of the major issues that we wish to examine.
Accordingly they are unable to examine the trade-offs  between  private
production  and  government  spending  that  we  wish to consider.
3/  One  might  also  wish to include  public  goods  in  private  consumption,  an
approach taken in Calvo (1979),  Groenwald (1980, 1982, 1984),  and
Johansson  (1982).
4/  Among these are Blanchard  and Sachs (1982),  Cuddington  and Johansson
(1986),  Marchand,  Mintz, and Pestieau  (1984,  1985),  Moore and Neary
(1984),  and  Neary  and  Stiglitz  (1983).-6  -
There  is also a considerable  literature  on empirical  evidence  for
the influence of government  expenditures  on real output.  Most of the
studies on developed countries, however, tend to neglect any direct
influence  of public  spending  on  private  investment  or output,  instead  using
a demand  driven  approach. There  have  been,  on the  other  hand,  a number  of
papers that examine  the relation  between  government  spending  and private
investment  in developing  countries. 5 The results  of these studies  are
quite  mixed,  however,  and, in  addition,  none  of them  are in the  context  of
an intertemporal  model  of the  type  we wish to construct. Tun  wai and  Wong
(1982),  for  example,  estimate  partial  equilibrium  models  for  11 developing
countries,  and  conclude  that  in 10 of the  11 countries  government  spending
has a positive  impact  on private  investment. Blejer  and Khan (1984),  on
the other hand, claim that the apparent  lack of relationship  that some
authors report between public sector investment  and private investment
reflects  the offsetting  effects  that different  types  of public  investment
have.  Unlike the two previous  studies,  which use a partial  equilibrium
setting  to analyze  government  spending,  Sundarajan  and  Thakur  (1980)  carry
out a study of India and Korea within a growth  model framework.  They
conclude  that  the  long-run multiplier  effects of  increased public
investment  in India  are  small,  although  in  Korea  they  are  quite  large.
In conjunction  with the examination  of the interactior.  between
government  spending  and private  production,  we also  wish to consider  the
5/  See  Blejer  and  Khan (1984),  David  and  Scadding  (1974),  von Furstenberg
and  Halkiel  (1977),  Galbis  (1979),  Heller  (1975),  Sundarajan  and  Thakur
(1980)  and  Tun  Wai  and  Wong (1982).extent to which government  fiscal  policy,  in particular  the reduction  of
spending,  is constrained  because of its interaction  with the balance of
payments.  There are a number  of theoretical  articles  over the past few
years  that  examine  the  impact  of government  policies  on the  exchange  rate.
Salant  and Henderson  (1978)  discuss  a rational  speculative  attack  within
the context  of a gold marXet.  Krugman (1979)  presents  a model in which
consumers,  who have perfect  foresight,  realize  that the government  can no
longer  defend  the present  fixed  exchange  rate,  and create  an attack  upon
the exchange  rate.  Attacks  on the rate become,  indeed,  self-fulfilling.
Similar  conclusions  are reached  in Flood  and Garber  (1984)  and Obstefeld
(1984). In these  papers,  the  attack  upon the  exchange  rate  comes  from  the
inconsistency  of internal  macroeconomic  policies  with the exchange  rate
policy of the government. Obstefeld  (1986)  develops  a model in which a
balance of payments  crisis  may be entirely  self-fulfilling,  and not the
result  of any government  macro  policies. A recent  paper that is perhaps
closer  to our  direction  of  study  is van Wijnbergen  (1986), which
specifically  considers  the  interaction  of the  government  budget  deficit  and
attacks  on the  exchange  rate.
There  are,  however,  certain  drawbacks  to the approaches  described
above.  On a  theoretical  level,  they  are all small  country  models  with no
non-traded goods; thus the only price determined in the modtl is the
exchange  rate. 6 Since  we specifically  wish to consider  the impact  of
government  purchases  of capital  and labor,  used to produce  infrastructure,
on private  output  and  investment,  this  is not  a useful  framework. Perhaps
6/  An exception  is  Connolly  and  Taylor  (1984),  which  does  incorporate  non-
traded  goods.more important,  with the  exception  of a recent  paper  by Blanco  and  Garber
(1986),  none of them  are  empirical.
In the  next  section we will  describe our mod-a.  It will
incorporate  non-traded  goods,  as well as being intertemporal  with perfect
foresight. Changes  in government  spending  will simultaneously  affect  both
private  output  as  well as the  foreign  reserve  positio.a  of the  country. The
changes  in reserves  will, in turn, trigger  changf,s  in the exchange  rate
that  the goverTment  is attempting  to  maintain  fixed. As in the  balance  of
payments  crisis literature, these changes, since they are perfectly
an'  Lcipated,  can trigger  a collapse  of the  currency,  essentiall)  capital
floiJs  respond  more rapidly  to changes  in the exchange  rate than does the
capit.l  account.
IT.  THE  MODEL
In this section we will describe the formal  structure  of our
model.  It is fully  intertemporal  and  has T discrete  time  periods,  with An
infinite  time horizon  future  beyond  the  third  period.  There  is
disaggregation in production,  as well as heterogeneous  consumers.  We
assume  that the  government  intends  for there  to  be a fixed  exchange  rate,
but will  allow the rate to vary depending upon its foreign reserve
position. 7 We  will first  describe  the  structure  of  production.
7/  Feltenstein  (1986)  constructs  a similar  model  of the real sector  in a
two-period  model,  but  assumes  a fixed  exchange  rate,  while  Feltenstein,
Lebow,  and  Sibert  (1987)  use a  pure  float.-9-
A.  kgductJ,
W. assume  that intermediate  and final  production  in period  i is
given  by an NxN input-output  matrix,  Ai.  Value  added  in the  jth  sector  in
time i,  vaji, is given  by a smooth  production  function  that  uses inputs  of
capital and labor from that period, as well as the existing  stock of
government  infrastructure.
et YJKi' YJLi be the inputs  of capital  and labor to the jth
sector in period i.  Let YGi be the outstanding  stock of government
infrastructure  in  period  i. The  production  of  value  added  is then  given  by
vaji  - vaji(yJKi,  YjLi YGi)  (3.1)
Here we are supposing that there is a single type of infrastructure,
although extensions to sector specific  infrastructure  would present  no
problem.
Infrastructure  may  be  thought  of,  for  example,  as roads,
communications,  education,  and so forth,  and enters  private  production  as
an increase  in productivity. It is thus  a public  good in that its  direct
costs are zero, although its indirect  costs  may be very high.  It is
asstmed  that sector  j  cost-minimizes  with respect  to capital  and labor.
Each  sector  pays  value  added  taxes  on inputs  of capital  and  labor,  given  by
tJKi,  tiLi,  respectively,  in  period  i.  Thus if PKi  and PLi  are  the  prices
of capital  and labor  in period  i, then the  prices  charged  by enterprises,
Pi,  cre  given  by
(Pi)  - va (P,  YGi)(l+t)(I-A)-,  (3.2)
where  Vi(P,YG)  is the  vector  of cost-minimizing  value-added  per  unit  of
;- 10  -
output,  subject  tc P  - (PKi,  PLi)  and  YG,  and  t  - {tKi,  tLi).
Private investment  is assumecd  to respond  to anticipated  future
returns  on capital,  as  well  as  future  interest  rates. Suppose  that
Hi  - Hi(YK, YLi) is a neoclassical  production function that produces
capital  uliing  inputs  of capital  and labor. Let CHi  be the  cost  minimizing
cost of producing  the quantity  Hi of capital.  It is assumed  that this
capital  does  not  begin  to  yield  a return  until  the  period  after  which  it is
produced. Accordingly,  if PKi is the  price  of capital  in  period  i, ri the
nominal  domestic  interest  rate,  and  6 the  rate  of depreciation  of capital,
then  we must  have:
iH 1- _Tl  PK,i+l(l-)i-l  Hi  +  (1-6)iT PKT(l+)iHi(3 3)
i-i  i  i-1  T+i
n  (l+rj)  II  (l+rj)
Here  the first term on  the right hand side represents the present
discounted  value  of the income  stream  from the  new investment  over the  T
discrete  time  periods.  The second  term represents  the present  discounted
value  of the infinite  time  horizon  after  period  T.  Here  we have supposed
that  the investor  expects  the  nominal  rental  price  of capital  to increase
by the rate of inflation,  w,  which  is taken  to  be constant,  'in  the  future
after  period  T.  If  we define  ri,  the  nominal  interest  rate,  as
ri  - pM.i+l  -l  (34)
PBiwhere  PMi is the  price  of money  at time  i and  PBi is the  price  of domestic
bonds  in  period  i,  equation  (3.3)  becomes
PM2C1  - PK2H1 +PB2PK3Hl(l-6)  +  PB3PK4Hl(l-6)  +
PBI  PM3  PM4
Combining  equation  (3.5)  with the conditions  for cost  minimization  we may
derive  an equation  in one  unknown. 8
We will  suppose  that  debt  is  short  term  and  must  be rolled  over  at
the  end  of each  period. Accordingly,  we will  define  the  private  issuance
of  bonds  in  period  i,  corresponding  to  period  1 investment,  yiBpi  as:
Y Bpi  (3.6)~~~~~~~~Bp
ylBpi  - PK,i+lH1(l;  )  :  i-l,..  .,T-l  (3.6)
pH.i+l
As we will show later, this definition of bond financing of
private investment will permit Walras' law to hold in each period.
Similarly,  we may  derive  period  2 investment,  H2, as
T  i-2
PM3CH2  TPKH2  +  s  PBiPK,i+lH2(l-S)  +i.2  . (3.7)
PB2  i-3  PM.i+1
and the  bond sales  in period  i to finance  period  2 investment,  y2Bpi,  are
given  by
Y2BPi  P  K,i+_  H2(l-  ;  i  2  ...T  (3.8)
PM,t+l
8/  Since  both money and bonds are issued  by the government  in financing
itself,  equation  (3.5)  should  indicate  how  public  deficits  that  change
domestic  interest  rates  may  crowd  out  private  investment.-12  -
We may similarly  calculate  period  j  investment  and  bond sales  in  period  i,
Hj and  YJBPi,  respectively.
The final  productive  agent  in our  model is the government,  which
produces  both current  and capital  output. We interpret  capital  output  as
being  spending  on infrastructure,  so that  the  government  has two  preduction
functions,  one for current output  and the other for the production  of
infrastructure. Infrastructure,  in turn,  enters  private  production  as a
productivity  increase. At this stage  we will make no distinction  between
current and capital expenditure.  Infrastructure  is produced  via neo-
classical  production  functions,  gi(yKi,  yLi),  in  period  i  which  use  capital
and  labor  in the  current  period. The  government  is  also  assumed  to  attempt
to  maximize  a weighted  average  of consumers'  utilities. If  we suppose  that
there  are I >  0 consumers  with intertemporal  utility  functions  Ui, to be
discussed  shortly,  then  the  government's  problem  is:
I
max E aiUi(xi),  (3.9)
i-l
where  (ai)  is  a set  of arbitrarily  given  weights,  and  Ui and  xi are  the  ith
consumer's  utility  function  and  intertemporal  consumption  vector,
respectively. We will discuss  the government's  financial  constraints  in
Section  3C,  where its  budget  identity  is  derived.-13-
B. ConsuM=tionU
There  are I  > 0 consumers  in  our  model  who have  perfect  foresight
in all  markets.  They maximize  intertemporal  utility  functions  subject  to
their  expectations  of future  exchange  rate changes  which are incorporated
into  their  budget  constraints.
Let xi-(xii...,xNi)  be  the consumers' c..'nsumption  vector in
period  i and  let  xLi  be his  consumption  of leisura. 9 We will suppose  that
the consumer  receives  utility  only from  consumption  of goods  generated  by
the  input-output matrix, and leisure.  He is required to cover his
expenditures  from income  in each period,  and  he pays ad valorem  tax rates
(ti)-(tll,...,tiN)  on consumption  of goods  in  period  i.  In  order  to derive
a  simple  analytical  expression  we will also suppose  that the consumer's
utility  function  is  of the  form
T  at  n  aji
iElxLijElxji  (3.10)
His  problem  is thus  to  maximize  (3.10)  subject  to
(l+ti)Pixi  + PLiXLi +  PMixMi +  PBixBi +  eixBFi % Yi  (3.11)
where
- PKlKo  +  PLILo  +  PMlBo  +  el(l  +  rFl)BFO  +  TRl
Yj  - PKJ(l-S)JKo +  PLiLo +  TRj
9/  We should,  to  be more  precise,  refer  to xji for  the  consumption  of the
jth consumer  in the ith  period.  In order  to avoid  illegible  notation
we will suppress  the  superscript  j.-14  -
and:
(1 +  tj)Pjxj +  PLJXLJ +  PMJXMJ +  PBJxBj +  ejxBFj S Yj  +  Pmjxm,J-l  (3.12)
+ PMjxB,j.1 +  ej(l +  rFj)XBFJ-1  for j  - 2,  .,T,
The consumer  is assumed  to face  a cash  constraint  which  connects
his  holdings  of  money  to his  consumption  and  the  interest  rate.
Accordingly,  we define  p  as:
Pj  ,  MJ  -XMJ  - a rj  ;  j  - 1,...,T; a, b 2 0  (3.13)
(14+tj)PjXj
In addition,  we suppose  that domestic  and foreign  bonds are not perfect
substitutes and  that the consumer chooses between them according to
relative  domestic  and  foreign  total bond  yields,  deflated by  the
anticipated  exchange  rate  change. Accordingly  defined  7  as:
X  PBJxBJ  I  C  1+  rj  d  -1,..  ,T;  c,d  2 0  (3.14)
eJXBFJ  (1+rFj)e4- 1
ei
Finally,  we close  the  consumer's  problem  by assuming  that  his
savings  rate  in  period  T is  given  by an exogenous  constant  dollars. If
savings  are  given  by domestic  plus foreign  assets,  then:  10
PBTxBT +  eTxBFT - S(l+tT)PTXT  (3.15)
10/  This savings  rate closttre  rule is equivalent  to an exogenous  bequest
rule.  An example of such a bequest rule is given in Fair (1984),
Chapter  3.- 15  -
Here  we define  xMi,  xBi,  XBFi  as the  consumer's  demands  for  money,
domestic and foreign bonds, respectively,  in period i, and ei as the
exchange  rate in period i.  Here ei is defined  as the domestic  currency
price  of foreign  assets. In addition,  rFi  is the  exogenously  given  foreign
interest  rate.  Finally,  TRi represents  any transfer  payments  the  consumer
receives from the government,  while Ko, Lo, MO, BFo are his  initial
allocations  of capital,  labor,  money,  domestic  and foreign  bonds.  Our  use
of a  money  constraint,  although  apparently  ad hoc,  could  be replaced  by an
equiv-alent  formulation  which incorporates  money in the  utility function.
Our  current  formulation,  however,  permits  direct  estimation,  which  will be
important  later.  The expenditure  elasticity  of the demand  for money is
taken  to  be unity  in order  to correspond  to the  requirement  of the  general
equilibrium  model  that  demands  be homengeous  of degree  zero in  prices. We
notice  that since  domestic  bonds  are short  term,  PM,i+lxBi,  reflects  both
principle  and  interest  in  petiod  i+l  on a  bond  purchased  in  period  i.
We may solve  the  consumer's  maximization  problem  in the  following
way.  Because of the restriction  of equation  (3.14)  on the holdings  of
different assets, the ratio of the Lagrange  multipliers  of the jth to
(j+l)th  budget  constraint  is:
-j  PM(j+l)  +  ej+l  (1  +  rFj)
A4  _  PBJ  ej  (3.16)
.0  1+ 1 -j
Define Nj as the ratio of the Lagrange  multiplier  of the jth and Tth
constraint,  i.e.,
T-1




Y*-  NjYj and
J-1
T  n
a  - aLZ E  aiL
J-1  i-l
then  demand  for  leisure,  xLj, is  giver;  by
aj*
XLj  - e4LJYj  - i,  ....  T  (3.17)
- PLj
Restriction  (3.17)  and the demand  for money gives  a total  coefficient  on
spending  in consumption,  Kj,  of
Kj - Nj(l- j) - Nj+lPM.j+lpj
PMJ
Restriction  (3.15)  implies
KT - 1 + Pj+s  + s
Now:




X  - i-  j - 1,..,T  (3.19)
aPHjKj
Demand  for  bonds  in  each  period  is  a  residual,  i.e.,  if
yl  -Yl  - PLlXLl  - (1  +  tl)Plxl  - PMlxMl- 17 -
Yj  - ij  +  PI IXMH.j-.I +  XB,j.-1J  +  (1  +  tFj)  j  XBF,j1  - PLJXLJ
- (1  +  tj)Pjxj  - PMjxMj:  i  - 2....,  T
Then
xBj  - yi  y
1+-tj  ]Bj3
and  (3.20)
XFBJ  '+tj  ij
1-e'j  PM3J  ej
C.  Budget  DeSficits  and  the  Adjustment  of the  Exchange  Rate
Let  Ti be the  total  taxes  collected  by  the  government  in  period  i,
and  let  Gi be  the  value  of  its  expenditures  on goods  and  services  in the
period. If  YBG 1 ._  is  the  government's  issue  of  bonds  in  period  i-1,  then
its  budget  deficit,  Di, in  period  i is:
i-1
Di - Gi +  PMiYBGi-l +  eirFi E  (DFO  +  CFj - AMj) - Ti  (3.21)
i-1
where  CFi is  the  gross  foreign  borrowing  of the  government  in  period  i,  AMi
is its amortization  of foreign  debt and DFo is its initial  foreign  debt.
Accordingly  the  term in parenthesis  is the  outstanding  foreign  debt  of the
government.- 18 -
The government finances  this deficit,  if Di is positive, from
three sources.  We will assume that the government's gross foreign
borrowinig  in  period  i,  CFi,  is  exogenously  determined. 11  Accordingly,  the
domestically  financed  portion of the budget deficit  is given by Di-CFi.
Let sBi  be that  portion  of the  domestic  financing  requirements  in period  i
that  is covere.  by the  sale  of domestic  bonds.  Here sBi  is any  continuous
function  of PBi, the  price  of bonds. Thus the  government's  issue  of money
and  bonds  in  period  i,  yMi,  YBi  is given  by12
PMiYMi  - (1  - sBi)(Di  - CFi)-
(3.22)
PBiYBi  - sBi(Di  - CFi)
11/  Clearly  it would  be incorrect  to claim that*  Mexico's  current  foreign
debt  has  been forced  upon it  by foreign  lenders. In Section  V we will
use an empirical  version  of our  model  to attempt  to replicate  outcomes
for 1983-85.  We would claim that during this period, after the
collapse  of the Mexican external  sector,  that there  was, indeed,  a
lender imposed constraint on Mexican foreign borrowing.  Thus the
assumed  exogeneity  of CFi seems reasonable  after 1982,  but would be
implausible  prior  to  that.
12/  We will later  impose  certain  conditions  on the  form  of sBi,  ds well as
on the  relationship between government spending and the rate of
inflation.-19  -
If,  on the  other  hand,  Di is  negative,  i.e.,  a surplus,  then  Di is
paid  out  as transfer  payments  to  consumers. Thus  the  jth consumer  receives
an exogenously  givcn  share  nji, in period  i, so that  ajiDi  corresponds  to
TRi in  equation  (3.12).
Apart  from  producing  infrastructure, collecting taxes, and
financing  the budget deficit,  the government  also attempts  to adjust  the
exchange rate.  The supply of foraign  reserves  YFGi, available  to the
government  in  period  i is  given  by
YFGi - YFG(i-l) +  Xi - Mi +  XF(i-1) - XFi +  CFi  (3.23)
Here xFi represents  the demand  for foreign  assets  by citizens  of
the  home country,  so  xF,i-i  - xFi  represents  private  capital  flows.
All terms on the right  hand side of equation  (3.23)  are solved
from the  maximization  problems  of the  domestic  and  foreign  consumer. What
is the demand  of the government  for foreign  assets?  Consider  Diagram  1
representing  the government's  exchange  rate  policy  rule in period  i.  The
horizontal  axis represents  the  market  exchange  rate in period  i, ei while
the vertical  axis represents  the government's  demand  for foreign  assets.
In addition,  let  xFi represent  the government's  critical  level  of foreign
reserves  in period  i.  This critical  level  is determined  exogenously,  and
in our simulations  in Section  V it is arbitrarily  taken to be equal to
three  months  of imports.. 20  -
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Let  us suppose  that  a  particular  exchange  rate  in  period  i, ei,  as
a shown  in  Diagram  1 is  depreciated  from  the  previous  period. Hence  ei >  ei..i
In this  case  we can  determine  a  well-defined  government  demand  for
reserves,  xaFi,  in the  diagram  and  given  formally  by
XFGi  - fi(ei)  (3.24)
where  fi  is  any  continuous,  monotonically  decreasing  function.
Equivalently,  if there  is a slight  decrease  in the  equilibrium  supply  of,
and  hence  demand  for,  foreign  reserves  by the  government  below  its  critical
level,  then there is a sharp depreciation  in the exchange  rate.  Recall
that  the  exchange  rate is in Pesos/$. We may then  construct  excess  demand
by the  government  for  foreign  reserves,  Di,  as
DFi - XFGi  - YFGi  (3.25)
In  particular,  we see  that  if ei  >  ei l, then  large  increases
in  e  i  cause  only  small  decreases  in  xFGi.  If,  in  equation  (3.23)
the  current  account  improves  more  rapidly  than  the  capital  account
deteriorates  in response  to  the  depreciation,  then  there  will  be a  net
a
decrease  in  DFi  in equation  (3.25). Thus,  in  particular,  increases  in  ei
above  ei.l  tend  to increase  the  supply  of foreign  assets  for  the
government,  thereby  driving  eia  down  toward  ei.l.  Suppose,  on the
other  hand,  that  eab  <  eijl.  In this  region  small  changes  in  ei cause-22  -
large  shifts  in  XFGi.  Thus,  in  a particular,  a decrease  in ei,  i.e.,  an
appreciation,  will cause  a sharp increase  in xFGi,  leading  to an increase
in DFi.  Hence the peso price  of  dollars  increases  and the exchange  rate
tends  to  move  back toward  ei1.
Thus the government  creates  a correspondence  between  changes in
the  exchange  rate and movements  away from the  critical  level  of reserves.
If,  as an extreme  case,  the  graph  in Diagram  1  becomes  horizontal  at xFi,
then  this  corresponds  to a pure float  when reserves  fall  to their  critical
level.  This is the scenario  of much of  the balance of payments  crisis
literature  cited  in Section  II,  which  thus  may  be viewed  as a special  case
of our model.  A graph  that  is close  to horizontal  below  xFi may  be taken
as representing  the  policy  of a nervous  government,  while  a graph  that is
closer  to  vertical  reflects  a relatively  unconcerned  policy.
D.  Excess  Demands
We may  now, in particular,  calculate  excess  demands  for goods  and
domestic  financial  assets.  Given xi - (xi 1 .-.,xiT),  the ith consumers
demand for intermediate  and final goods in each period, we calculate
aggregate  demand
I
x  - E xi,  (3.26)
i-l
and  hence activity  levels  z for the intertemporal  input-output  matrix  are
given  by
z  - (I  - lx
We may thus  derive  inputs  of capital  and labor  in  private  production. Let
yKji,  YLji  be the  inputs  of capital  and  labor  per  unit  of output  in  the  jth
sector in period i, given cost minimization  of equation (3.1).  Total- 23  -
inputs  of  capital  and  labor  YKpi.  YLPi  to  private  production  are  then  given
by:
YKP  - EYKjizji.  YLPi  - EYLji  Zji  ;  i  - 1,...T  (3.27)
Let  YKGi and  YKHi be the  government's  and the  private  investment
sector's  respective  inputs  of capital  in  period  i,  while  YLGi  and  yLHi  are
the corresponding  inputs  of labor.  The aggregate  inputs  of capital  and
labor  in  each  period  may  then  be derived  as
YKi  - YKPi +  YKGi +  YKHi  (3.28)
YLi  - YLPi  +  YLGi + YLHi
Excess  deman4  for  capital  in  period  i,  DKi,  is then  given  by
DKi  - YKi - (1  - 6)YK(i-l)  - Hi-l  (3.29)
where  6  is the  rate  of depreciation  of capital  and  YKi  is the  stock  of
capital  at the  end  of period  i.  The  excess  demand  for  labor,  DLi,  is given  by
DLi  - XLi +  YLi  '  Lo
where xLi is the aggregate  demand  for leisure  in period  i.  Demands  for
money  and  bonds  are  derived  from  the  consumers  maximization  problems,  while
their supply is derived from equations  (3.6)  and (3.8)  giving sales of
bonds  by private  investors,  and equation  (3.22),  giving  issuance  of money
and  bonds  by  the  government.  Thus  excess  demands  may  be derived.- 24 -
IV.  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  AN EOUILIBRIUM
The proof of the existence  of equilibrium  depends  upon proving
certain  properties  for the  excess  demand  functions,  namely  that they are
homogeneous  in prices,  that they are continuous  and convex,  and that  they
satisfy  Walras'  law. Accordingly,  let  us define  y(p),  the  augmented  supply
vector,  as
y(p  - (yj,.  ..,yT,u(Dl)...,(DT)),  (4.1)
where
u(Di)  - Di:  Di  S  0
u(Di)  - 0:  Di  >  0.
and where  Di is the government  budget deficit in period i, and yi,
aggregate  supply  in  period  i, is  given  by
Yi - (YKi,YLi,YMi,YBi,YFi)-
Similarly,  we define  x(p),  the  augmented  demand  vector,  as
x(p)  - (xi,...xT,  - TR  ,  ... ,  - TRT)
where
xi  '(0,  XLi,  XMit  XBi,xFi)-- 25 -
We need  to show  that  there  exists  some  price  vector  p*,  such  that
x(p*)  - y(p*)  - 0.
The demonstration  that  Walras'  law  holds in each period  is given
in the  Appendix.  Let us note the government's  demand  for foreign  assets
enters as an expenditure into its budge. constraint  and, accordingly,
requires a  corresponding  domestic financing.  Typically  this would be
monetization,  although  we could  also allow  bond sales. Similarly,  foreign
borrowing  by the government  enters  as a revenue,  reducing  its domestic
financing  requirement.
In order to complete the demonstration  of an existence  of an
equilibrium  we must show that excess demand functions are convex and
bounded.  The problem of boundedness,  which arises in the government's
supply  of money and bonds,  has been discussed  in Feltenstein  (1986). A
solution  was derived  which  essentially  requires  the  government  to decrease
its  spending  on real  goods  and  services  as the  interest  or inflation  rates
rise.  Convexity  is somewhat  more  difficult,  however.
Our problem arises  from the fact that government's  issuance  of
bonds or money in period  i, YBGi and yMi, respectively,  increases  as the
corresponding  prices  drop,  thus  leading  to a  downward  sloping  supply  curve.
For example,  as the price of domestic  bonds,  PBi, falls,  the government
must increase its bond sales in order to finance a particular  budget
deficit. We will circumvent  this  problem  in the  following  way.  We will
suppose  that  the  government  has  a fixed  target,  YBGi,  for  the  sales  of
bonds  in  each  period. The  nominal  value  of the  government's  bond  sales- 26 -
PBiYBGi.  of course  depends  upon the  market  price  of  bonds.  Let  us define  a
price  index,  CPIi,  in  period  i  as:
N
CPIi  - E  OjPN(i-l)  +  j  (4.2)
J-1
where  ai  are  a set  of fixed  consumption  weights, 13 and  PN(i-l)  +  j  is the
price  of the  jth  good  in  period  i. (Recall  that  there  are  N goods). Let  gi
be the  government's  target  output  of real  goods  and  services  in  period  i.
We will suppose  that  the  government  sets  a new  target,  gi,  that  depends
upon  the  price  level  as
CpIi/PMi
Hence  as the  money  priced  level  rises  the  government  reduces  real  spending.
Let  di  be the  nominal  cost  of producing  gi,  and  Gi the  cost  of
producing  gi.  Accordingly,  the  government's  budget  deficit  in  neriod  i,
Di, is  given  by
G  ~~~  ~~~i-l  i-l
Di  +  i  + PMiYBG(i-1)  +  ei (DFo  +  E  CFj - Z  AMj)-  Ti.  (4.3)
CPI  i/PHi  j  1  jini
13/  We take  these  to  be weights  in the  consumer  price  index.
I- 27 -
Hence  the  portion  of the  deficit  left  to be financed  by monetization  after
foreign  bor:rowing  and  bond sales  is given  by
i-l  i-l
PmiYKi  __Gi  +  PMiYBG(i4l)  +  eiri(DFo  +  E  CFi - Z  AMj)  (4.4)
CPIu/pMi  j-1  J-i
- Ti - PBiYBGi  - *iCFi
Hence
i-l  i-l
(Ti  +  PMiYBGi  +  eiCFi  - eiri(DFo  +  E  Cpi  - Z AMj)
YMi  - i  +  YBG(i-l)  J-1  J1  (4'5)
CPII  PMi
Thus  we  have that  YMi.  the  change  in  the  money  supply  is convex  in
PMi. the  price  of  money  if:
i-1  i-l
Ti +  PM  YBGi  +  eiCFi  t  ei ri(DFO  +  Z  CFi - AMj)
J.1  i-1
This  condition is equivalent to saying that the value of taxes plus
domestic and foreign borrowing in period i must be greater than the
government's  foreign  interest  obligations.  Although  this  would  normally  be
the case,  it  would  be quite  possible  to construct  an example  in  which the
converse was  true, leading to a non-convexity  and a non-existence  of
equilibrium.
A further  problem  in  proving  the  existence  of an  equilibrium  comes
from the interaction  between  changes  in foreign  reserves  and the exchange
rate.  Let us refer to equations  (3.23)  and '3.25).  Here we note in
equation  (3.23)  that if an exchange  rate devaluation  causes  the current28 -
account  to improve  less  rapidy than  the  capital  account  deteriorates,  then
there  will  be a decrease  in the  supply  of foreign  reserves  available  to the
government,  YFGi.  If we refer  to Diagram  1 we see  that the  government's
demand  for  foreign  assets,  xFGi,  also  falls  wich the  devaluation.  Thus,  in
this  case,  if the  fall  in  the  supply  of foreign  assets,  YFGi,  is  more rapid
than the reduction in the government's demand for assets, then the
devaluation  will have led to an increase  in excess demand  for foreign
assets, and will thereby  be destabilizing. This could, in particular,
happen in a floating  exchange  rate regime  where the government  fixes  its
demand  for reserves. In the  numerical  work reported  in the  next section,
this  instability  has  not  proven  to  be a problem. In general,  the  closer  to
being  perfect  substitutes  are  domestic  and foreign  assets,  the  more likely
will be non-convexity  in equation  (3.27),  and hence unstable  behavior  of
the  model. A  mechanical,  and possibly  economically  unsatisfactorily  way of
coping  with  this  situation  would  be to impose  restriction  on capital  flows,
which  in this  case  would  consist  in imposing  a ceiling  on the  net  increase
in  holdings  of foreign  assets  permitted  to  consumers.
V.  AN APPLICATION  TO  MEXICO
In this  section  we shall  attempt  to  apply  our  model  to  the  case  of
Mexico.  We have estimated  a number  of the structural  elements  in the
theoretical  model  using  Mexican  data,  and then simulated  the  model over  a
three year period, representing  1983-85, in order to see whether it
generates some approximation  to Mexican reality.  We then attempt to
determine  the implications  of changes  in certain  government  policies.  It
should  be noted that the  model is not fully  esnimated,  so the results  we- 29 -
report should be considered only to be  illustrative. Our data is as
foilows.
The  Mexican  input-output data  is given  by  a  72x72 matrix
representing  the  year 1978.14 Since  our current  aim is to explain  certain
macroeconomic  phenomena,  we have aggregated  this intermediate  and final
production  to give  a 7x7  matrix,  the  sectors  of  which  are:
(1) Agriculture  (4)  Commerce
(2) Manufacturing  (5)  Transportation
(3)  Petroleum  (6)  Communications  and  services
(7) Imports
For each  of these  sectors  we have  estimated  shares  of capital  and
labor in Cobb-Douglas  production  functions.  We have not estimated  the
elasticities  of government  infrastructure,  but  have carried  out  simulations
with  alternative  parameter  values. The shares  are:
Table  5.1.  Factor  Shares  in Private  Production  A/
Sector  Share  of Capital  Share  of  Labor
1  0.762  0.238
2  0.552  0.448
3  0.659  0.341
4  0.757  0.243
5  0.636  0.364
n ./aS  0.505
A/ See Matriz  de Insumo-Producto  Afto  1978, (1983).  Sector  7, imports,
does  not  use inputs  of capital  and  labor.
14/  See Matriz de Insumo-Producto  Ahlo  1978, (1983).  We aggregated  the
matrix  by simply  adding  corresponding  rows  and  columns.- 30 -
The shares are assumed  to remain constant  over the three years of the
model.
We have also estimated  shares  of capital  and labor  in government
production,  using the  wage bill as the share  of labor.  These shares  are
taken  to  have their  actual  values  for  each  of the  years  1983-85. They  are:
Table  5.2.  Factor  Shares  in  Government  Production  A/
Share  of Capital  Share  of Labor
1983  0.463  0.537
1984  0.461  0.539
1985  0.447  0.553
A/  See  Informe  Annual.  1985 (1986),  p. 163.
Similarly,  factor  shares  in investment  were  estimated  as shares  in
the construction  industry  with the share of capital  being 0.291 and the
share  of labor  being  0.709.15
We constructed  initial  allocations  of factors  and  financial  assets
in the following  way.  We took  the total  returns  to capital  and labor  in
15/  See  Sistema  de Cuentas  Nacionales  de  Mexico  (1981),  Volume  I, Table  16,
p. 94.- 31 -
1982 as representing  their initial  stocks.  Thus a unit of labor, for
example,  is that which earned  one peso in 1982.16  The initial  stock  of
money is taken  to be the  end of 1982 stock  M2.17  The initial  stocks  of
domestic  bond  holdings  by private  citizens  was taken  as total  non-monetary
savings  held by the  banking system  (Pasivos  no monetarios-instrumentos  de
ahorro).1 8 Holdings  of foreign  assets  by Mexican  citizens  were derived  in
the following way.  Zedillo (1986)  derives  a series  of annual capital
flight  figures  from 1970 to 1984.  We have added  these  flows  from 1970 to
1982 to arrive  at an end of 1982 figure  for  holding  of foreign  assets  by
Mexicans. The  resulting  allocations  are:
Table  5.4. Initial  Allocations
Capital  A/  Labor  A/  Money  g/  Domestic  Bonds  A/  Foreign  Bonds i
5.202  3.828  3.311  2.328  2.189
A/  In  lOOOx  billion  pesos
hi  In  lOx  billion  US $
16/  The initial  allocations  of capital  and  labor  are  derived  from,  Sistema
de Cuentas  Consolidades  de la  Nacion  (1985). Table  1,  page  1 and  Table
20,
p.  9.
17/  See  International  Financial  Statistics  (1985).
18/  See  Indicadores  Economicos  (1986),  Table  I-H-24.-32  -
We  need  also  derive  the  initial  stock  of  government
infrastructure.  Since  there  is  no direct  information  on capital  stocks,  we
have summed  public  fixed  capital  formation  from 1970 to 1982,  assuming  F
rate  of depreciation  of 5 percent,  to arrive  at a figure  of 726.7  billion
constant  1970 pesos. 19 Government  current  and capital  expenditures  for
1983-85  were taken  to  be their  actual  amounts. 20
Foreign borrowing, which wee the actual  values for 1983-85  of
foreign borrowing by the banking system (Pasivos  no monetarios  con el
sector  externo), 21 while amortization  was also given its actual  values.
Government  tax rates  on capital  and  labor  were taken  as the  effective  rate
of revenue  collection  on the respective  factors  in each  year, 1983-85.22
19/  These are taken  from Sistema  de Cuentas  Nacionales  de Mexico (1979),
Table  137,  p. 238;  (1982),  Table  67,  p. 104; (1985)  Table  65,  p. 20.
20/  These are taken from Sistema de Cuentas Consolidades  de la Nacion
(1985),  Table  65,  p. 20;  (1986),  Table  16,  p. 16.
21/  See  IndicAdores  Economicos  (1986),  Tables  I-4,  6,8  an I-H-24.
22/  See CIEMEX-WHARTON (1986), Tables 4, 15 and Sistema de Cuentas
Consolidades  de la  Nacion  (1985),  Table  3.-33  -
Similarly,  effective  rates  were  determined  for  PEMEX,23 for  the
atricultural  sector, 24 and  for  the  remaining  four  sectors  in the  economy. 25
the resulting  tax  rates  were  4 percent  on capital  and  7  percent  on labor  in
lV83-84  and 4 percent  on capital  and 6.9  percent  on labor  in 1985.  The
dectoral  indirect  tax  rates  were:
Table  S.5. Indirect  Tax  Rates
Sector
1  2  3  4  5  5  7  A/
1983  0  0.053  0.286  0.053  0.053  0.053  0.0798
1984  0  0.051  0.277  0.051  0.051  0.051  0.0710
1985  0  0.051  0.256  0.051  0.051  0.051  0.0798
Al'  The tariff  rate for sector  7, imports,  is derived  from CIEHEX-WHARTON
(1986)  Tables  8, 9,  15.
23/  See  CIENEX-WHARTON  (1986),'Table  15;  Sistema  de  Cuentas  Consolidates  de
la  Nacion  (1985),  Table  26; (1986),  Table  41.
24/  See  Sistema  de Cuentas  Consolidades  de la  Nacion,  Table  5.
25/  See  Sistema  de Cuentas  Consolidades  de la  Nacion  (1985),  Tables  3, 5-9;
(1986)  Table  21.-34  -
In order to generate the necessary parameters in the Mexican
consumer's  maximization  problem we have assumed there to be a single
domestic  consumer,  and  have  derived  consumption  weights  from  the
aggregation  of the original  input-output  matrix. 26 We did not directly
estimate  an elasticity  of demand  for  leisure,  but experimented  with  various
values.  The foreign  consumer  is represented  by an export  equation  which
determines the total U.S. dollar amount that he will spend on Mexican
exports. This total  is then  divided  into  consumption  on Mexican  output  of
agriculture,  manufacturing  and petroleum  with shares  of 0.075,  0.531,  and
0.394,  respectively. 27 The aggregate  export  equation  was estimated  by OLS
using annual  data for non-oil  exports  over the period  1950-1985  with the
following  results.
log  E  - -0.88  - 0.12  log  RP +  0.12  log  RP.1 - 0.22  log  RP-2 +  1.75  log  U
(0.69)  (-0.04)  (0.31)  (-0.64)  (2.13)
- - 0.77  log  U-1 - 0.88  log  U-2 +  0.95  log  E-1 (5.1)
-(0.65)  (-1.18)  (14.05)
R2 - 0.99  H - Statistic  - 1.48
26/  Consumption  weights for domestic goods are derived from Matriz de
Insumo-Producto  Ahio (1978) (1983), Table 1, while the weights for
imports  came  from  the  same  source,  Table  5.
27/  These shares  are derived  from Sistema  de Cuentas  Consolidades  de la
Nacion  (1985),  Table  69,  where  we have  used  1982  shares  in  exports.- 35 -
Here  we make the  following  definitions.
(a)  E  - Mexican  non-oil  exports  in  US$s.
(b)  RP - Relative  US$  price  index  of  Mexican  exports  to the
US price  index.
(c)  US nominal  GNP.
The figures  in  parenthesis  are  t-statistics.  We notice  that  US GNP and  the
lagged  dependent  variable  are  significant,  a.'.d  that  the  long-run
olasticities  all have the correct signs.  The long run relative  price
elasticity  is 4.4, while that of US GNP is 2.0.28  Finally,  we did  not
attempt  to estimate  an oil export  equation,  and oil exports  were taken  to
be exogenous.
Two  other  equation  estimations  are  needed  to  close  the
determination  of consumption. A money  detui-Ld  equation  was  estimated  using
annual  data for the  period  1950-1985. We wish to estimate  an equation  of
the  form:
log  Md - ao  +  al log  C +  a2r  where:
(5.2)
log  M- log  M_ 1 - p(log  Md - log  M)
Here  we define:
(a) Md  - desired  stock  of  money
(b) M  - money  supply
(c)  C  - nominal  consumption
(d)  r  - domestic  interest  rate
(e) p  - an adjustment parameter representing the speed of
adjustment  of actual  to  desired  money  stocks.
28/  Thus  in estimation  we  treat the relative price  index as being
exogenous,  although  in  the general equilibrium model  it is an
endogenous  variable.- 36 -
In  order  to  maintain  homogeneity  in  consumption,  as required  in the  general
equilibrium  model, 29 we set  al  - 1  and  obtain:
log  M/C  - Pao  +  Pa 2r +  (1-P)  log  M.l/C
(5.3)
Equation  (5.3)  was estimated  over the period  1950-1985  using MH
for  money and  replacing  r by x, the inflation  rate in the  wholesale  price
index. 30 The results  are
log  M/C  - - 0.37 - 0.23  r  +  0.83  log  MH1/C
(-0.41)  (-3.71) (7.21)  (54)
R2  - 0.65  D.W.  - 1.88
We may then  identify  the  underlying  parameters  as:
ao  - -2.18,  a1 - 1,  a2 - -1.35,  o  - 0.17  (5.5)
4
so that  the  demand  for  money  function  given  in equation  (3.13)  is:
N - 0.113  r-1. 35C  (5.6)
29/  A uniform  increase  in the  price  level  cannot  have an effect  on excess
demand,  as would be the case if a, oi, if we are to demonstrate  the
existence  of an  equilibrium.
30/  This was done because  interest  rates  were controlled  for  much of our
sample  period and hence do not reflect  true opportunity  costs.  Our
general  equilibrium  model,  however,  uses  r.- 37 -
We must also estimate the portfolio  balance equation  given in
equation  (3.16). We used  an equation  of the  form:
log  xd _ bo +  bl (e  - e.1)  + b2 log  _  (5.7)
Xf  Xf  -1
where Xd, Xf represent the peso value of domestic and foreign asset
holdings  by Mexican  consumers,  respectively,  and  e is the  peso/US$  exchange
rate.  This  was estimatea  over  the  period  1970-1985  with  annual  data,  since
there  is  no information  on  capital  flight  prior  to 1970,  with the  results:
log  Id - 0.28 - 0.72 (e-e- 1) +  0.45  xd
Xf  Xf -1
(2.79) (-3.00)  (2.79)
(5.8)
R2 - 0.74  D.W.  - 2.48
We thus  note that  all  parameters  are  significant  and  have  the  correct  sign.
We tried a number of different  specifications  of the portfolio  balance
equation,  attempting  to  determine  an impact  of relative  interest  rates. In
none of the tests  did we find interest  rates to be significant,  however,
probably  reflecting  the controls  that were in place on Mexican interest
rates  for  much of the  sample  period.
Our next task is to stimulate  the model,  based on 1982 initial
allocations,  to see if it has some resemblance  to the  actual  outcomes  for
1983-85. Accordingly,  we allow  government  current  and capital  expenditure
to take  their  actual  values  for  1983-85. We also  suppose  that  the  Central
Bank maintains  a level  of reserves  equal  to three  months  of the  level  of
imports  in 1982.  Clearly  this  is an arbitrary  rule,  but it  corresponds  to
a  standard  policy  prescription.  Thus  this  would  mean  that  the  government's
ex'change  rule, given in Diagram 1, would be a  horizontal  line.  This- 38 -
simulation  is then assuming  that the  governmt.it  allows  the rate to freely
float. Clearly  this is contrary  to actual  policy,  when the  government  was
actively intervening  both in foreign  exchange  markets and the domestic
money markets.  Thus it should not be expected that our simulations
precisely  replicate  Mexican  outcomes.
Finally,  we assume  that  the  elasticity  of  private  value  added  with
respect  to the  stock  of government  infrastructure,  as in  equation  (3.1),  is
0.05, a figure  deliberately  taken to be quite low.  It is by no means
necessary  for  government  capital  spending  i.e.,  spending  on infrastructure,
to  be productive. Indeed,  in  the  final  simulation  reported  in  this  section
we have  taken the elasticity of private production with respect to
government  infrastructure  to be 0.O.  It should  thus be noted that the
elascitity  reflects  the  productivity  of private  output  with respect  to the
stock of public infrastructure  rather than with respect to government
spending.  Since  only  a  portion  of  government  spending  goes  to
infrastructure,  the productivity of total government  spending  would be
considerably  lower  than  the  figure  we  have  chosen  for  public
infrastructure.  We also have taken the government's domest4c debt
issuance,  which  our  nodel requires  to be fixed,  to be equal  to its  actual
values  for  1983-85.
Table  5.6 reports the simulation outcomes of macroeconomic
variables,  with actual  historical  values  in  parenthesis. 31
31/  The model was solved using a vaAiant of Merrill's shrinking gr'.d
fixed-point  algorithm.  A copy  of the  computer  program  developed  by the
authors  is available  upon  request.- 39  -
Table  5.6:  Base  Simulation  with  Fixed  Central  Bank
Reserves  and  Historical  Government  Spending
1983  1984  1985
Change  in real  GNP:  AGNP  a/  2.5  (3.7)  0.3  (2.7)
Government  spending:  G b/ c/  17.1  (18.9)  14.7  (16.3)  11.2  (18.7)
Tax  revenues:  T b/ c/  8.6  (12.9)  9.3  (11.9)  9.2  (11.9)
Government  budget  deficit:  D  b/ -8.5  (-6.0)  -5.4 (-4.4)  -2.0 (-6.8)
Private  investment:  I  b/  10.2  (9.7)  9.7  (9.2)  12.2  (10.1)
Exports:  X b/  13.5  (15.4)  10.3  (14.2)  9.3  (12.5)
Imports:  M b/  5.9  (5.4)  6.4  (6.7)  6.6  (7.6)
Trade  balance:  TB b/  7.6  (10.0)  3.9  (7.5)  2.7  (4.9)
Inflation  rate:  w dj  a/  62.3  (63.6)  35.6  (55.2)
Interest  rate:  i d/  70.0  (59.2)  72.1  (49.5)  72.7  (63.4)
Change  in exchange  rate:  e  a/  36.7  (39.2)  22.7  (52.3)
Reserves  of the  Central
Bank:  R e/  3.43  3.43  3.43
Change  in  the  real  exchange
rate:  i  f/  18.7  (17.5)  10.5  (1.9)
a/  We cannot  calculate  the  percentage  change  in the  first  year.
hi  In  percent  of GNP.
g/  We have re-calculated  the actual  values of G  and T so that their
components  correspond  to those  included  in  our  model.
A/  percent.
~/  In  billions  of US dollars. This simulation  assumes  a fixed  stock  of
reserves, so there is no point in making comparison  with actual
reserves.
j/  The change  in the real exchange  rate is calculated  as the change  in
the US dollar price of Mexican goods, hence as lr/e.  Since, in
reality,  the  Mexican  government  was  actively  devaluing  during  the  time
period, rather than floating  as in our simulation,  the real rate
actually  appreciated  less  than  our  prediction.-40  -
We notice  that,  in  most  cases,  the  direction  of change  of the  macroeconomic
variables  has been correctly  determined. The overall  depreciation  of the
exchange  rate  is considerably  lower  than  reality,  probably  corresponding  to
the  fact  that  the  net reserves  of the  Mexican  Central  Bank  rose  by about  25
percent  from 1983  to 1985. Our simulation  assumes  that  reserves  are  fixed
and thus  generates  a less  rapid  devaluation  than  would  a scenario  in  which
the government  increases  its  net reserves. It should  also  be noted that
the  model  generates  higher  real  in1;erest  rates  than  were  actually  observed,
although  their  direction  of change  is correct.  This is possibly  because
Mexico,  by using  capital  controls,  did  not require  the  high real interest
rates  generated  by our  model  in order  to induce  consumers  to  held domestic
assets.  Finally,  the  government  budget  deficit  declines  in the simulated
results, although  in reality it realized  a slight  increase.  Simulated
private  investment  is thus  higher  than in reality,  as the  model tends  to
underestimate  the  extent  to  which  crowding  out  has occurred.
Suppose  that  the government  decides  to carry  out  an exchange  rate
policy  of "leaning  against  the  wind."  We will assume  that,  in Diagram  1,
the slope  of the line  above  xFi is -6,  while  the right  of xFi it is - 3.
These numbers are, of course, arbitrary but  they indicate that the
government  devalues  zapidly  when reserves  fall  below  their  critical  levels
and  revalues  slowly  when they  rise  above  them. All other  policy  parameters
remain  as  before. When  we re-simulate  the  model  the  results  are:- 41  -
Table  5.7. Base  Simulation  with  Active
Government  Exchange  Rate  Policy  A/
1983  1984  1985
A GNP  3.5  (2.5)  -0.7  (0.3)
D  -10.3  (-8.5)  -5.4  (-5.4)  -2.6  (-2.0)
I  10.2  (10.2)  9.1  (9.7)  12.2  (12.2)
X  13.5  (13.5)  10.1  (10.3)  9.2  (9.3)
M  5.9  (5.9)  6.4  (6.4)  (6.6)  (6.6)
TB  7.6  (7.6)  3.7  (3.9)  2.6  (2.7)
w  60.2  (62.3)  35.5  (35.6)
i  69.0  (70.0)  72.6  (72.1)  72.7  (72.7)
e  33.1  (36.7)  24.3  (22.7)
R  4.22  (3.43)  1.97  (3.43)  2.00  (3.43)
E  20.4  (18.7)  9.0  (10.5)
A/  The numbers  in parenthesis  are the simulation  outcomes  reported  in
Table  5.8,  while  all  footnotes  of  Table  5.8  apply  here  also.
We thus  notice  that this change  in exchange  rate  policies  of the
government  has relatively  minor  effects. There  is a slight  decrease  in the
aggregate  growth  of the economy,  and there  is an decrease  in the reserves
of the  Central  Bank,  as the  exchange  rate  devalues  slightly  less  under  the
-ew regime  than it did  under  the  pure float.  Finally,  the  utility  of the
domestic  consumer  in the  floating  rate  case  was 461.8,  while  under  the  new
jegime it was 463.0, so "leaning  against the wind" seems here to be a
Pareto  improvement,  primarily  because  the  reduction  in reserves  adds  to the
consumer's  utility.-42  -
Suppose  we now turn to a somewhat  more interesting  example  that
reflects  our initial  concern  with ways of reducing  the size of the  public
sector.  Accordingly,  we  carry  out  a  simulation  which  fixes  the
government's  demand  for  reserves,  as in the  example  reported  in  Table  5.6,
but reduces  real government  spending  on goods  and services,  both current
and capital,  by 25 percent  in each  period.  Presumably  this  should  reduce
the  rate  of  growth  of  infrastructure, but  should also have anti-
inflationary  effects. The  results,  however,  are  rather  different.
Table  5.8. Simulation  with  Fixed  Central  Bank
Reserves  and  Reduced  Government  Spending  a/
1983  1984  1985
A GNP  3.0.  (2.5)  -0.6  (0.3)
D  -10.6  (-8.5)  -6.5  (-5.4)  -3.2  (-2.0)
I  10.0  (10.2)  9.0  (9.7)  12.3  (12.2)
X  13.6  (13.5)  10.3  (10.3)  9.3  (9.3)
H  6.0  (5.9)  6.5  (6.4)  6.6  (6.6)
TB  7.6  (7.6)  3.8  (3.9)  2.7  (2.7)
if  68.8  (62.3)  37.7  (35.6)
i  77.1  (70.0)  74.9  (72.1)  72.4  (72.7)
&  41.1  (36.7)  25.1  (22.7)
R  3.43  (3.43)  3.43  (3.43)  3.43  (3.43
E  (19.6) (18.7)  10.1  (10.5)
a/  The numbers in parenthesis  are those of Table (5.6) while all
footnote  of Table  (5.6)  apply  here  also.- 43  -
We thius  notice  that has been a decline  in the  aggregate  rate of
growth  of real  GNP, from  2.8  percent  to 2.4  percent  over 1984-85,  as  might
have  been expected,  given  the lower  government  spending  on infrastructure.
What is not expected  is that the rate of inflation  has increased,  as has
the rate of devaluation  of the domestic  currency.  In addition,  and a
probable  cause for the above two outcomes,  the government  budget  deficit
has risen  significantly  as a percentage  of GNP, as the tax  base  has eroded
more  rapidly than government expenditures  have declined.  There is,
however,  another  important  difference  between  the  two  simulations. In the
base case the  peso/$  exchange  rate  was 1.23  by the third  period,  while in
the  case  of reduced  spending  the  rate  is  0.99  in the  third  period. 32 Thus
the reduction  in government  spending  caused  there to be less  pressure  on
the balance of payments  than in the initial  case,  as the same level of
reserves  was maintained  in both cases.  As a result,  the utility  of the
Edomestic  consumer  is 463.5 in the case of reduced  government  spending,
higher  then  in the  base  case.  This  improvement  is,  caused  primarily  by the
lower price of imports.  Similarly,  there is a slight increase  in the
aggregate  rate  of change  in the  real  exchange  rate.
As a final  example,  let us take a pessimistic  view of government
spending,  namely  that it  has  no direct  impact  on private  output. Thus the
elasticity  of private  output  with respect  to government  infrastrutcture,  as
in equation  (3.1),  is 0.  The government  purchases  capital  and labor  and
produces  nothing  useful  with them. We will  return  to our  original  example,
32/  These values  should not be compared with actual data because of
different  unit definitions.  Changes  are  the  only  relevant  comparison.- 44.
Table (5.6),  and assume  that the government  fixes its stock  of reserves.
The  aggregate  outcomes  for  real  GDP,  real  private  consumption  and  the  price
level  are:
Table  5.9: Base  Simulation  with  Government  SpendiLng  not
Entering  Infrastructure  g/
1983  1984  1985
Real GDP  >/  318.6  (386.5)  324.1  (396.2)  334.6  (397.4)
Real  private
consumption  219.9  (267.2)  247.4  (302.6)  258.7  (307.3)
Price  index  q/  121.8  (100.0)  200.5  (162.3)  260.0  (220.1)  w
n/  The  numbers  in  parenthesis  correspond  to the  results  of Table  (5.6).
k/  Real  GDP is based  upon the  price  index  for  1983 generated  by the  bate
case  example  of Table  (5.6).
g/  The  price index  in the  base case  example  is set to  be equal  to 100 in
1983.
We thus notice that the assumption  of nonproductive  government
leads to much lower levels  of real GDP and private  consumption  than are
evident  in the base case.  In addition,  the overall  price index  is 18.1
percent higher by 1985 than before, indicating  the impact  on aggregate
outcome caused  by the incorporation  of the infrastructure  elasticity  of
0.05.  Finally,  the domestic  consumer's  utility  level,  that  was 463.5 in
the original example,  has  fallen to 275.3,  corresponding  to the sharp
decline  in  private  consumption.- 45 -
VI.  CONCLUSION
We  have  constructed  an  n  - period,  perfect  foresight,
intertemporal  general  equilibrium  model that is designed  to analyze  the
impact on the  economy of reductions in public spending.  The model
incorporates  certain  features  that  are  important  in  analyzing  public  policy
in  Mexico,  the  country  to  which  the  model  is applied. Among  these  features
are public infrastructure  that enters  private  production  and a reserve-
based government  exchange  rate policy.  The parameters  of the model are
estimated  using  Mexican  data  and  a 3-year  benchmark  equilibrium  is  computed
for 1983-85. Counterfactual  simulations  are then  carried  out,  with one of
the  conclusions  being  that,  depending  upon  the  elasticity  of private  output
pith respect  to government  infrastructure,  it is possible  for a reduction
in  public  spending  to  be inflationary.
Our conclusions  are  highly  sensitive  to the  elasticity  of private
output to public  infrastructure.  Since we have not estimated these
elasticities,  our results  must be viewed  as being subject  to considerable
doubt.  If, for example,  the elasticity  was zero,  then  we would  have the
expected  results  that  any increase  in government  spending  would  be welfare
deteriorating.  It is quite striking,  however, that even with the low
assumed  elasticity  of private  output  with respect  to public  infrastructure
of 0.05, it is possible  to construct  examples  where reducing  government
spending is both inflationary  and welfare improving.  Accordingly,  we
should be  cautious about dogmatically  suggesting reductions in public
spending,  and should  carefully  consider  the coordination  of the spending
cuts  with appropriate  monetary  and  exchange  rate  policies.- 46  -
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We will first  demonstrate  that  Walras'  law  holds  in each period.
Let Ei denote  value  of aggregate  expenditure  in  period  i and Si the  value
of aggregate  supply. We will  show that  Walras'  law  holds in  3 periods,  as
the  generalization  to T  periods  is straight-forward.  In  period  1  we have
Sl  - [pl(I-A)  - plva(p)]yj  - Gl  +  PKlKO  +  PLlLo  +  PMlMo  +  PMlBo  +  eiBpo
+  elBFGO +  PBlYBP1 - PKlYKHIl  - PLlYLHI +  PMlYMl +  PBlYBGI
+  elXFl  +  elCFl  +  elrFlBFpo
- tKlPKlYKPl  +  tLlPLlYLPl  - G
+  PKlKo +  PLiLo +  PMlMo +  PMiBo +  eiBppo +  elBFGO +  PMlYMl +  PB1YBG1
+  elXFl +  elCFl  +  elrFlBFPO
El - PKI +  PLlLo +  PMlMo +  PMl 1o +  el(l+rFl)BFPo +  elxFGl
N
+  elrFlDFO  +  elAM1 +  elXFl  +  TR1  +  E  tjxu
J  -1
Here  we define
Gi  - government  spending  on goods  and  services  in  period  i.
BFPO  - initial  private  holding  of foreign  assets.
BFGO  - initial  government  holdings  of foreign  assets.
YMi  - money issued  to finance  the government  budget  deficit
in  period  i.
YBGi  - bonds issued  to finance  the government  budget  deficit
in  period  i.Page 2  of  5
XFi  - value  of exports  in  period  i.
CFI  - government  foreign  borrowing  in  period  i.
rFi  - foreign  interest  rate.
AMi  - Amortization  of foreign  debt  at time  i.
DFo  - Outstanding  foreign debt of the government  at the
start  of  period  1.
We thus  have
El - S1 - (Gl  - EtjXLj  - tKlPKlYKPl  - tLlPLlYLPl  + PHlBo  +  el(xFGl
+  rFlDFo  +  AM 1) - el(BFGo  +  CFI))  - PHlYHl  - PBlYBGl  +  TR 1
- DI  - PMlY  - PBlYBGl  +  R1,
Hence,
xl(p)  - yl(P)  - Dl - PMlYMl  - PBlYBGl  +  TR1 - TR 1 - u(D 1) - 0
as
Dl  - PmlYMl  +  PBlYBG1;  D1 >  0.
Here we have defined Di as the government's  budget deficit,
treating  foreign  borrowing  as a revenue.
In  period  2  we have
S2-  P2(I  - A2 )  - p2 va(p)]y 2-G2 +  PK2( 1 - 6)Ko  +  PL2Lo  +  PM2u(XBlY-Bl)
+  PM2XHl  +  (PB2YPBP2  P2  )  +  PK2Hl  +  PB2Y  BP2 - PK2YKH2
PM2
+ PL2YLH2  +  PH2YM2  + PB2YBG2  +  e2(l +  rF2)XBFl  +  e2YFG102CF2Page  3  of 5
+  62XF2
- tK2PK2YKP2  +  tL2PL2YLP2  -.  G2 +  PK2( 1 - 6)Ko  +  PL2Lo
+  PM2u(XBl  - YB1)  +  PM2XMl  +  PM2Y 1BP1  +  PM2YM2  +  PB2YBG2
+  02(1  +  rFG)XBF1  +  e2YFG1  +  82CF2  +  e2XF2
E2  PK2(1 6)Ko  +  PL?Lo  +  PM2U(YB1 - XB1) +  PM2XMl  +  PM2XBl
+  e2(1  +  rF2)XBF1  +  e2XFG2 +  e2rF2(DFo  +  CF1  - AMi)  +  e2AM2
N




E2-S2-  (G 2 - E  tjXLj  - tK2PK2YKP2  - tL2PL2YLP2  +  e2rF2(DFo
+  CF1  - AM 1)  +  e 2AM 2 +  e2XFG2  - e2(YFG1  +  CF2)
+  PM2YB1  - PM2Y 1BP1) - PM2YM3  - PB2YBG2  +  TR2
as
PK2H1  -PM2Y 1BP1-
But
PM2YB1  - PM2Y 1BP1  - PM2YBG1
So
E2 - S2  - D2 - PM2YM2  - PB2YBG2  + TR2Page  4  of 5
and x(p) - y(p) - 0 as before.  Note that in the  definition  of period  2
supply,  we decrease  the money supply  by an amount  corresponding  to the
rollover  of  period  i  private  debt  issuance.
Finally,  in  period  3
S3 - (p3(I  - A) - p3va(p)]y3 - +  PK3(1 - l  )2K0 +  PL3Lo
+  PM3u(xB2 - YB2) +  PM3XM2 +  [PB3Y 1Bp3 +  N  B
PM3
+  [pB3y 2Bp3  EM3PB3y BP3  - +  PK3(1 - 6)H1 +  PK3H2 +  PB3Y BP3
PM3
PK3YKH3 - PL3YLH3 +  PM3YM3 +  PB3YBG3 +  e3(l +  rF3)xBF2
+  e3yFG2  +  e3CF3  +  e3XF3
tJK3PK3YKP3  +  tL3PL3YLP3 - G3r
*  PK3(l  - 6)2Ko +  PL3Lo +  PM3u(xB2-YB2)  +  PM3XM2
+  PK3(1 - 6)H 1 +  PK3H2 + PM3YM3  +  PB3YBG3 +  e3(l +  rF3)XBF2
+  e3yFG2 +  e3CF3 +  e3XF3
E - PK3(1 - 6)2KO +  PL3Lo +  PM3u(YB2 - XB2) +  PM3XM2 +  PH3XB2
+  e3(l  +  rF3)XBF2  +  e3xFG3  +  e3rF3(DFo  +  CF1  +  CF2  - AM1 - AM2)Page 5  of 5
N
+ e3AM3 +  e3X3 + TR3 - E  tjxLj
3-1
Now,
PK3(l  -)Hl  - PM3Y
1 BP2
PK3H2  -PH3Y 2 BP2
Thus,
N
E3-  S3 - (G 3 E  tjxLj - tK3PK3YKP3 - tL3PL3YLP3  +  e3rF3(DFo
+  CF1  +  CF2  - AM1 - AM2)  +  e3AN3 +  e3xFG3  - e3(YFG2  +  CF2)
+  PM3YB2  - PM3Y 1BR2  - PM3Y2BP2) - PM3YM3-PB3YBG3 +  TR3
and
PM3YB2  - PM3Y 1BP2  - PM3Y2BP2 - PM3YBG2
Thus
E3-  S3 - D3 - PM3YM3 - PB3YBG3 +  TR3
and x(p) - y(p) - 0 as before.PPR Working Paper Series
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A perfect foresight, intertemporal general  productivity of private capital.
equilibrium model can be used to analyze the
fiscal impact of xeductions  in public spending.  The model does not estimate the elasticity of
The model permits a consistent analysis of  private output to public infrastructure.  But even
government spending, deficit financing, and  if low elasticity is assumed, spending cuts may
exchange rate behavior.  produce a reduction in private productivity that
will have an undesirable effect.
It incorporates features important to analyz-
ing public policy in Mexico, including the cost  A decline in productivity may outweigh the
of producing government infrastructure, a tax  impact of falling monetary growth rates and
system and government exchange rate policy  reduced budget deficits.  If it does, the benefit of
similar to those in Mexico, and the estimated  spending on infrastructure outweighs its costs.
savings behavior of domestic consumers.  If, however, government spending produces no
useful infrastructure, a reduction in spending
Mexican public spending increased from  will have the desired result of reducing inflation.
25.6 percent of GDP in 1973 to 46.5 percent in
1982. This rise was accompanied by dramatic  Various simulations with the model indicate
increases in inflation, the govemment deficit,  that dogmatic recommendations for spending
and extemal debt.  cuts can at times be counterproductive.
Policymakers look at such a situation and  This paper is a product of the Public Eco-
automatically conclude that stabilization dc-  nomics Division, Country Economics Depart-
pends on reduced public spending.  But when  ment.  Copies are available free from the World
applicd to Mexican data for 1983-85, the model  Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC
shows that public spending cuts alone may be  20433.  Please contact Ann Bhalla, room N10-
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